






The Seveso disaster was an industrial accident that occurred around 12:37 pm on 10 July 1976, in a small chemical manufacturing plant approximately 15 km north of Milan in Italy.

2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid





Scenario-Based Strategies to Enhance Chemical Plant Safety and Security

Joshua H. MUSTAFA

Chemical Inspector & Government Analyst

Government Chemist Laboratory Authority (GCLA)
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Blueprint of the Course: Chemical Security Management

Who are the learners

Learners for this course are professionals, supervisors and those who are directly or indirectly engaging with chemical safety and security management.

They can have a substantial experience in misuse chemicals and security management in chemical facility/supply chain, and chemical plant safety and need to enhance their knowledge of safety and security management strategies and security audit methodologies to prevent misuse of chemicals in the life

Mission statement

This course is primarily focused on chemical safety and security management strategies in the chemical life cycle of chemicals towards the prevention of chemical incidents/terrorist attacks.

Look & Feel

Participants will be able to understand the importance to secure misuse chemicals to prevent chemical incidents regardless of security barriers and developing scenarios to prevent them, and what strategies we could utilize to overcome possible chemical incident scenarios in the future.

Quote

This course provides new insight on chemical plant security management systems to improve process security and vulnerability assessment through the supply chain.

Learning objectives

During this course, learners will improve their understanding of security best practices for the life cycle of chemicals and emerging threats to chemical infrastructure security and how to mitigate chemical incidents based on scenarios.

At the end of this course, participants would be able to recognize new comprehensive and operative methodologies for chemical facilities safety and security based on future possible catastrophic scenarios.


Assessment

Assessment is based on identifying unforeseen and undetected scenarios leading to chemical incidents and identifying emerging threats that would contribute to future chemical incidents.

Table-top exercises on multiple uses of chemicals will be provided to evaluate tasks sensitive to human error in the chemical process and decision-making strategies for accident prevention and preparedness.

What do you think about when I say:

Strategy?







Chemical Safety





Chemical Security







Safety and Security Culture

Mature Culture

(Company knows, cares, and measures)

Proactive Culture

02

(Company care and always know how to improve)

ow how to improve)

Chemical safety and security is our top priority and is embedded in our culture and we know it is good for company security

Compliance Culture

(Company care but doesn't always know)

Reactive Culture

(Company knows but doesn't always

care)

Pathological Culture

(Company doesn't know and doesn't care about chemical security and safety) 03


04

Continual improvement is important and everyone is involved

Complying is important and you have systems in place to manage misuse chemicals and chemical accidents

Responding when you have incidents or inspections is important.

Chemical safety and security is not important and we don't bother about it.



PREVENT

SECURE

Prevent the risk of chemical related accidents/incidents on chemical plant

Secure chemical industries and related assets in the company

DEVELOP

Develop innovative strategies to protect chemical plants by developing novel tools

STRENGTHEN

Strengthen
and enhance stakeholders' ability to
understand, aware, of safety and security







3. Strategic Barriers as Layers of Protection



Even the Best Barriers Can Fail

"Even the best barrier will not achieve perfect reliability."






New Barriers




Barriers




Strengthening Existing Barriers










Protect Chemical Plant - What is a barrier?





Physical Barriers: contain, protect, or separate

- Alarm system
- Automated valves system
- Fences
- Fume hoods
- Locks
- Gates/Doors
- Cameras

1.Physical

- 2. Operational
- 3. Organizational



Protect Chemical Plant - What is a barrier?





Operational Barriers:

Tasks performed by a person or group of people

- Procedures
- Inspections/Audits
- Self-control of work/checklists
- Quality system documents


1. Physical

2.Operational

3. Organizational



Protect Chemical Plant - What is a barrier?






Organizational Barriers


- Policies
- Rules
- Management systems
- Directives

- 1. Physical
- 2. Operational


3. Organizational

Protect Chemicals from Intruders





Chemical Safety Case Study 1



Safety Case Study: UCLA Chemistry Lab Fire

On Dec. 29, 2008, Sheri Sangji, 23, was injured by the chemical fire and died on Jan. 16, 2009, from injuries sustained in a fire in a UCLA chemistry laboratory. Working with *tert*-butyllithium, which ignites spontaneously in air, she was drawing the chemical from a bottle into a syringe when the plunger came out of the syringe barrel.

UCLA police dispatch recorded the 911 call at 2:54 PM as an "unknown type chemical fire." Emergency crews were dispatched at 2:57 PM, and emergency medical personnel arrived at the building at 3:01 PM. Lutton donned full protective gear and went up to the lab to assess the situation, with dispatch recording at 3:06 PM that the fire was out upon arrival.



Prof Harran

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

How could this incident have been prevented?

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff.

01 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, A PUBLIC CORPORATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.

and

02 PATRICK HARRAN (7-13-69)

Defendants.

CASE NO. BA392069

CL

LOS ANG

CL

COURT

FELONY COMPLAINT FOR ARREST WARRANT

The undersigned is informed and believes that:


COUNT 1

On or about December 29, 2008, in the County of Los Angeles, the crime of WILLFUL VIOLATION OF AN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH STANDARD CAUSING THE DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEE, in violation of LABOR CODE SECTION 6425(a), a Felony, was committed by THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, A PUBLIC CORPORATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, and PATRICK HARRAN WAS AN ANGELES.



Layers of Protection: How Could UCLA Incident Have

Been Prevented



Walls

Tanks

Fences


Locks

Gates/Doors

Cameras

Chemical Safety Case Study 2






Chemical Safety Case Study 3

The explosion at jiangsu Tian Jiayi chemical co., LTD waste facility




Nitrified Waste NO₃ NO₂



Hazardous Waste Explosion - Jiangsu Tianijiayi Chemical Co. Ltd

Data showed that the solid waste storage capacity of Jiangsu Xiangshui Tianjia Yihua factory was up to 1078 cubic meters, which is used to store the waste liquid and solid waste produced in the factory. In addition, the plant has a hazardous waste storage yard for the storage of hazardous waste, with an annual output of 4,500 tons. There were 64 people who died at the premieres were workers.





Chemical safety and security is the responsibility of everyone – play your part well!

THANK YOU.